wechat-send-message-attack-vectors.md
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WeChat Send Message — Attack Vector Analysis
Date: 2026-06-30 Source: smali analysis + MCP database queries + xhshook framework experience
Summary
WeChat 8.0.74 message sending analyzed through 5 attack vectors.
Lowest-risk viable path: LSPosed Hook sk.p0().
1. Architecture
UI: sk.p0(String msg, int type, String extra)
→ DB insert (message table, status=2)
→ NetSceneSendMsg (w11/r0.smali)
→ CGI: /cgi-bin/micromsg-bin/newsendmsg
→ Request: r45/ez5 { d:int, e:LinkedList<r45/ll4> }
→ Response: r45/fz5
→ mars::stn ECDH-encrypted tunnel
→ WeChat Server
2. Five Attack Vectors
Vector 1: DB Injection — BLOCKED
mars uses in-memory task queue. message table is history-only. No pending status exists.
Vector 2: LSPosed Hook sk.p0() — VIABLE ✅
Module skeleton at ~/WeChatHook/. xhshook framework proven. Target: sk.p0(String, int, String).
Vector 3: HTTP CGI — BLOCKED
CGI /cgi-bin/micromsg-bin/newsendmsg exists but transported through mars tunnel, not direct HTTP.
Vector 4: mars Queue Injection — Hard ⚠️
Requires Frida native hook on mars::stn::StartTask().
Vector 5: Frida Native Protocol — Hard + High Ban Risk 🔴
Tencent MTP/MSaoAidSec actively hunts Frida.
3. Key Smali Files
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
| w11/r0.smali | NetSceneSendMsg |
| r45/ez5.smali | SendMsgRequest protobuf |
| r45/fz5.smali | SendMsgResponse protobuf |
| r45/ll4.smali | Per-message protobuf |
4. EnMicroMsg.db
252 tables. message: status 2=sent, 3=delivered. No pending state. Query via mcp_android_phone_query_wechat().