wechat-send-message-attack-vectors.md 1.62 KB

WeChat Send Message — Attack Vector Analysis

Date: 2026-06-30 Source: smali analysis + MCP database queries + xhshook framework experience

Summary

WeChat 8.0.74 message sending analyzed through 5 attack vectors. Lowest-risk viable path: LSPosed Hook sk.p0().


1. Architecture

UI: sk.p0(String msg, int type, String extra)
  → DB insert (message table, status=2)
    → NetSceneSendMsg (w11/r0.smali)
      → CGI: /cgi-bin/micromsg-bin/newsendmsg
      → Request: r45/ez5 { d:int, e:LinkedList<r45/ll4> }
      → Response: r45/fz5
        → mars::stn ECDH-encrypted tunnel
          → WeChat Server

2. Five Attack Vectors

Vector 1: DB Injection — BLOCKED

mars uses in-memory task queue. message table is history-only. No pending status exists.

Vector 2: LSPosed Hook sk.p0() — VIABLE ✅

Module skeleton at ~/WeChatHook/. xhshook framework proven. Target: sk.p0(String, int, String).

Vector 3: HTTP CGI — BLOCKED

CGI /cgi-bin/micromsg-bin/newsendmsg exists but transported through mars tunnel, not direct HTTP.

Vector 4: mars Queue Injection — Hard ⚠️

Requires Frida native hook on mars::stn::StartTask().

Vector 5: Frida Native Protocol — Hard + High Ban Risk 🔴

Tencent MTP/MSaoAidSec actively hunts Frida.

3. Key Smali Files

File Purpose
w11/r0.smali NetSceneSendMsg
r45/ez5.smali SendMsgRequest protobuf
r45/fz5.smali SendMsgResponse protobuf
r45/ll4.smali Per-message protobuf

4. EnMicroMsg.db

252 tables. message: status 2=sent, 3=delivered. No pending state. Query via mcp_android_phone_query_wechat().