# WeChat Send Message — Attack Vector Analysis Date: 2026-06-30 Source: smali analysis + MCP database queries + xhshook framework experience ## Summary WeChat 8.0.74 message sending analyzed through 5 attack vectors. Lowest-risk viable path: LSPosed Hook `sk.p0()`. --- ## 1. Architecture ``` UI: sk.p0(String msg, int type, String extra) → DB insert (message table, status=2) → NetSceneSendMsg (w11/r0.smali) → CGI: /cgi-bin/micromsg-bin/newsendmsg → Request: r45/ez5 { d:int, e:LinkedList } → Response: r45/fz5 → mars::stn ECDH-encrypted tunnel → WeChat Server ``` ## 2. Five Attack Vectors ### Vector 1: DB Injection — BLOCKED mars uses in-memory task queue. message table is history-only. No pending status exists. ### Vector 2: LSPosed Hook sk.p0() — VIABLE ✅ Module skeleton at ~/WeChatHook/. xhshook framework proven. Target: sk.p0(String, int, String). ### Vector 3: HTTP CGI — BLOCKED CGI `/cgi-bin/micromsg-bin/newsendmsg` exists but transported through mars tunnel, not direct HTTP. ### Vector 4: mars Queue Injection — Hard ⚠️ Requires Frida native hook on mars::stn::StartTask(). ### Vector 5: Frida Native Protocol — Hard + High Ban Risk 🔴 Tencent MTP/MSaoAidSec actively hunts Frida. ## 3. Key Smali Files | File | Purpose | |------|---------| | w11/r0.smali | NetSceneSendMsg | | r45/ez5.smali | SendMsgRequest protobuf | | r45/fz5.smali | SendMsgResponse protobuf | | r45/ll4.smali | Per-message protobuf | ## 4. EnMicroMsg.db 252 tables. message: status 2=sent, 3=delivered. No pending state. Query via mcp_android_phone_query_wechat().