--- title: WeChat Group Daily Digest description: Read WeChat group messages, extract public account articles and video content, and summarize article contents from URLs. Also covers WeChat message sending reverse engineering. name: wechat-group-digest trigger: When user asks for WeChat group digest, wants to read/send WeChat messages, or reverse engineer WeChat internals. --- # WeChat Group Daily Digest & RE Skill ## WeChat Message Sending Architecture (2026-06-30) WeChat messages use Tencent's **mars** networking framework (native C++), NOT HTTP REST: ``` Java UI: ChattingUI → sk.p0(String msg, int type, String extra) ↓ writes to DB (status=2, history only) mars Bridge: libMMProtocalJni.so → protobuf + ECDH/AES encrypt mars Native: libmarscomm.so (queue), libmarsquic.so (QUIC transport) ↓ TCP/QUIC WeChat Server ``` ### Attack Vector Analysis (5 paths, by ban risk) | Rank | Path | Ban Risk | Status | |------|------|:---:|--------| | 1 | A. DB Injection | 🟢 Low | ❌ mars uses in-memory queue | | 2 | D. HTTP CGI Fallback | 🟢 Low | ❌ CGI through mars tunnel | | 3 | B. LSPosed Hook sk.p0() | 🟡 Low-Med | ✅ Viable, skeleton ready | | 4 | C. mars Queue Injection | 🟠 Med | Needs Frida native | | 5 | E. Frida Native Protocol | 🔴 High | Tencent anti-Frida SDK | ### Path A: DB Injection — BLOCKED - `message` table is history-only; mars has in-memory task queue - Status codes: 2=sent(37), 3=delivered(2692). No status=0/1 messages exist - `massendinfo` is media upload queue only (not text) ### Path D: HTTP CGI — BLOCKED - CGI EXISTS: `POST /cgi-bin/micromsg-bin/newsendmsg`, FuncID 522 - Request: `ez5 { d:int, e:LinkedList }` protobuf - Transported through mars::stn ECDH tunnel, NOT direct HTTP ### Path B: LSPosed Hook — VIABLE - **Target**: `com.tencent.mm.ui.chatting.component.sk.p0(String, int, String)` - **Module skeleton**: `~/WeChatHook/` - **ON-DEVICE compilation**: Full toolchain at `~/tmp/android-sdk/build-tools/36.0.0/` (d8, apksigner, zipalign), `~/tmp/android.jar` (27MB), `~/tmp/api-82.jar`. Gradle 9.6 + Java 17 in Termux. - **Risk**: WeChat historically tolerant of Xposed modules ### Key File Paths ``` w11/r0.smali — NetSceneSendMsg (CGI path + protobuf) w11/e0.smali — NetSceneNewSync (CGI: /cgi-bin/micromsg-bin/newsync) r45/ez5.smali — SendMsgRequest protobuf r45/fz5.smali — SendMsgResponse protobuf r45/ll4.smali — Individual message protobuf ``` ## WeChat Viewer Web App (2026-07-08) 项目路径: `~/wechat-viewer/`。架构原则:**日报生成和图片生成走 Hermes CLI 子进程 + skill,不写死 Python**。用户原话:"应该调用 Hermes 子任务来完成。不是写死 Python 代码,未来 skill 变化时没法迭代。" - **Page 1 (/)**: 会话列表 → 点击跳转 `/chat/` 独立聊天页。每个群聊右侧有 📋 生成日报按钮 - **Page 2 (/circle)**: 本地 SQLite 加工数据中心 - **Page 3 (/reports)**: 日报列表 → 生成日报按钮 flush → Hermes CLI 子进程加载 wechat-group-digest skill → LLM 归纳话题 → Markdown 入库。每条日报有「生成图片」和「删除」按钮 - **Page 4 (/report-images)**: 日报图片列表 → 每个日报点「生成图片」→ Hermes CLI 加载 gpt-image-gen skill → GPT Image 2 API → WSJ 风格图。有「发送微信」按钮(弹窗选联系人 → 直接调 send_image_via_hook) - **聊天页**: 无限滚动(最新在上),图片/语音/文章卡片/视频号卡片。右上角 📋 生成日报按钮 启动: `bash ~/wechat-viewer/restart.sh` **发图到微信**: 不走 Hermes 子进程,直接 `from wechat_hook_send import send_image_via_hook` 在 daemon thread 里调。因为 MCP tool 在 `hermes chat -t terminal` 里不可用。 详见 skill `wechat-web-viewer`。 启动: `bash ~/wechat-viewer/restart.sh`(先 kill 旧进程再启动,避免端口冲突通知轰炸) ### 关键技术细节 (详见 `references/wechat-message-content-format.md`) - sqlcipher 输出 `ok\n` 前缀 → `output[2:].strip()` 后再 json.loads - Flask 无法直接读 WeChat 数据目录 (PermissionError) → `_safe_exists()` + `su -c "cp ... /tmp && chmod 644"` - 图片: `THUMBNAIL_DIRPATH://th_` → `image2/{hash[:2]}/{hash[2:4]}/.jpg` (原图优先, 56-123KB) 或 `th_` (缩略图回退, 2-12KB)。同 hash 的 `.jpg` 文件是微信在本地缓存的原始分辨率版本——不是在微信内打开过就不会有。 - 语音: 用 `su -c find` 查 `voice2/` 下的 `msg_.amr`, 文件路径含非 hash 前缀子目录 - 视频号 CDATA: `re.sub(r"", r"\\1", content)` 后才能提取 nickname/desc/coverUrl ## Digest Pipeline (Core Workflow) 1. Query WeChat group messages via MCP: `mcp_android_phone_query_wechat(sql)` 2. Extract articles (type=49), discussions (type=1) 3. **Article summary reuse** (2026-07-08): a. Collect all article URLs + titles into a list b. Call `POST http://127.0.0.1:5000/api/articles/check-summaries` with JSON `{"urls": [{"url": "...", "title": "..."}, ...], "type": "summary"}` c. The API returns `{results: {dedup_key: {id, content, ...}}, missing: [{url, title, dedup_key}]}` d. Already-summarized articles: directly include their `content` in the report, marked `[已缓存]` e. Missing articles: curl the article URL + generate a summary, then call `POST http://127.0.0.1:5000/api/articles/summarize` with `{"url": "...", "title": "..."}` to persist the new summary into daily_reports for next time 4. Generate complete Markdown report (titles + summaries + sources + keywords) 5. Generate infographic (newspaper style, Chinese-only, no fictional content) 6. Send via ADBKeyboard workflow (search-and-tap + broadcast) ### Article Summary Reuse API (批量查询去重) Endpoint: `POST http://127.0.0.1:5000/api/articles/check-summaries` Request: ```json { "urls": [ {"url": "https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/...", "title": "文章标题"}, ... ], "type": "summary" // "summary" | "learn" | "" (any) } ``` Response: ```json { "ok": true, "data": { "results": { "biz|mid|idx|sn": { "id": 42, "content": "# 标题 摘要\n\n核心观点...", "report_date": "summary", "created_at": "2026-07-08 10:30:00" } }, "missing": [ {"url": "https://...", "title": "未缓存文章", "dedup_key": "abc|123|1|def"} ] } } ``` To persist a freshly-generated summary so it's reusable: ```bash curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:5000/api/articles/summarize \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"url": "ARTICLE_URL", "title": "ARTICLE_TITLE"}' ``` This endpoint auto-returns cached results if already exists; only spawns a Hermes subprocess for new summaries. ### Critical Rules - **Report-first**: Always generate complete Markdown report before infographic - **Content-only**: Never invent fictional sections in infographics - **Chinese-only**: All infographic text in Chinese - **Complete extraction**: Every article title + summary + source - **Discussion summarization**: Topics + participants + viewpoints ### Group Identification - Use `rcontact.nickname` for group name (reliable) - `chatroom.displayname` for member verification only ### Message Types | Type | Meaning | |------|---------| | 1 | Text | | 3 | Image | | 34 | Voice | | 43 | Video | | 47 | Emoji | | 49 | Article/link | | 10000 | System | | 754974769 | Unsupported / Finder (解析 `` 里的 `nickname`/`desc`/`coverUrl`/`videoPlayDuration` 做视频号卡片) | | 822083633 | Referenced reply (appmsg with refermsg) | **FinderFeed (视频号) 解析要点**: 内容包裹在 `` XML 内,**关键字段被 CDATA 包裹**(如 ``)。解析前必须先 `re.sub(r"", r"\\1", content)` 去掉 CDATA,否则 regex 匹配不到具体值。可用字段:``, ``, ``, ``, `` (视频下载链接), `` (秒)。 See `references/wechat-message-content-format.md` for complete content format reference. - Chatroom message `sender:\n` prefix stripping - Image path resolution from `imgPath` (hash subdirectories, `THUMBNAIL_DIRPATH://`) - Voice path resolution (complex directory structure, use `find`) - SQLCipher CLI quirks ("ok\n" prefix, multi-line JSON, `su` permission handling) - Group name resolution (`rcontact.nickname` vs `chatroom.displayname`) ## Sending Messages (ADBKeyboard Workflow) **WARNING**: The MCP tool `send_wechat_message` / `send_wechat_message_ui()` calls `am force-stop com.tencent.mm` before every send (wechat_send.py:363). This kills tablet login. If tablet login is active, use the manual ADBKeyboard workflow below and SKIP the force-stop step. 1. Open WeChat → search-and-tap target chat 2. Set ADBKeyboard: `ime set com.android.adbkeyboard/.AdbIME` 3. Clear field: `ADB_INPUT_CODE 67` × 10-15 4. Type: `ADB_INPUT_TEXT --es msg "text"` 5. OCR-find send button, tap 6. Verify in DB: `SELECT ... FROM message WHERE isSend=1 ORDER BY createTime DESC LIMIT 1` 7. Restore keyboard **Pitfall**: `mcp_android_phone_send_wechat_message` unreliable for ALL chat types AND kills tablet login. Use manual ADBKeyboard workflow. ## File Locations - **CGI analysis**: `references/wechat-sendmsg-cgi-analysis.md` - **LSPosed module design**: `references/wechat-lsposed-send-module.md` - **On-Device LSPosed build**: `references/on-device-xposed-build.md` - **LSPosed DB config**: `references/lsposed-module-config.md` - **SQLCipher DB access**: `references/sqlcipher-wechat-db-access.md` - **MCP parsing guide**: `references/mcp-output-parsing-guide.md` - **ADBKeyboard workflow**: `references/adbkeyboard-manual-send-workflow.md` - **Infographic v4**: `references/newspaper_infographic_v4.py` ## Pitfalls 1. WeChat timestamps are in ms since epoch, convert to Beijing time (UTC+8) 2. Group name in `rcontact.nickname`, not `chatroom.chatroomnick` (usually NULL) 3. `mcp_android_phone_send_wechat_message` unreliable for ALL chat types 4. ADBKeyboard accumulates text — always clear field with backspace before typing 5. Report-first workflow: NEVER generate infographic directly from raw messages 6. Chinese-only infographics: titles, section names, dates all in Chinese 7. Content-only rule: no fictional sections in generated images 8. Outer screen send coordinates differ from inner screen — always OCR for send button 9. Dozing state blocks screenshots — use `keyevent 26` (power key) to wake 10. Foldable screens require long display IDs for screencap 11. MCP output is double-escaped JSON — use `json.loads()` not string replace 12. WeChat CGI endpoints are mars-transported, NOT plain HTTP 13. On-device Android compilation IS possible — toolchain at `~/tmp/android-sdk/` 14. **TABLET LOGIN FATAL**: `send_wechat_message_ui()` calls `am force-stop com.tencent.mm` before every send (wechat_send.py:363). This KILLS the tablet login session. NEVER use this function if tablet login is active. Use manual ADBKeyboard workflow WITHOUT force-stop instead. 15. **LSPosed DAEMON FATAL**: `killall lspd` permanently kills the daemon on JingMatrix Vector A16 — it does NOT auto-restart. Only reboot restores it. Never kill lspd. 16. **LSPosed DB FATAL**: Writing to `/data/adb/lspd/config/modules_config.db` via sqlcipher/sqlite3 can trigger LSPosed's FileObserver to delete module entries. Never toggle the enabled field via SQL — use LSPosed Manager UI only. 17. **Check tablet login before any WeChat operation**: verify lspd running (`pgrep -f lspd`), WeChatHook injected (grep /proc//maps for lspd .so), and WeChat not on login screen. → Full root cause analysis: `references/tablet-login-protection.md`